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There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the effect of foreign aid— concessional loans 
and grants—on fiscal tax revenues. Most scholars argue that loans have a positive effect on 
taxation revenue because of the obligation to repay them, whereas grants have a negative effect 
because the recipient treats them as ‘free’ money and as a substitute for taxation. 
This study focuses on the impact of foreign loans and grants on tax revenues for 42 Sub- 
Saharan African countries for the period 1990-2014. We test the above hypothesis for these 
African countries, but divide them into different income groups to account for underlying 
structural differences. 
Our results show that both concessional loans and grants have a negative effect on taxation 
revenue when all countries are pooled, and similarly for low-income and lower-middle income 
countries. As most of these countries received debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor 
Country (HIPC) Initiative, we argue that recipient governments formulate an expectation of 
always receiving debt forgiveness and therefore treat both loans and grants as a “free” source 
of funds. This creates a disincentive to tax citizens who demand accountability for their taxes. 
However, upper-middle income countries (HICs) respond differently. Loans and grants have a 
positive effect on tax revenue in these countries. The effect of loans is a result of upper-income 
countries being ineligible for debt relief and therefore obligated to repay their loans, which 
creates an incentive to collect more taxes. The positive relationship between grants and tax 
revenue is explained by the fact that HICs have achieved a significant level of development, 
which translates to increased levels of efficiency and accountability in revenue systems from 
additional resources added to the fiscal. 
As a policy recommendation to address the disincentive created by grants, we argue that grants 
should be channeled through Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or the private sector, 
rather than given directly to the governments. 
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To meet Millennium Development goals, and more recently, sustainable development goals, 
donor countries have been asked to rise their contribution towards official development 
assistance (ODA). There is an ongoing debate on the form which foreign aid to low-income 
and lower-middle income countries should take. That is, whether these should be loans or 
grants. This debate was necessitated by unsustainable debts in these countries as a result of 
receiving foreign aid in the form of loans. This led to the evolution of foreign aid towards 
grants. 
This study analyses the effect of foreign aid, and more specifically, concessional loans and 
grants, on taxation revenue. Based on our literature review, we conclude that there is no 
consensus on the effect of foreign loans and grants on tax revenue. Scholars have found 
different responses of tax revenue as a result of changes in either foreign loans or grants to 
recipient countries. Many scholars argue that foreign loans have positive effects on tax revenue 
due to the obligation to repay these loans. In contrast, foreign grants tend to have a negative 
effect, since they are treated as “free” money by the recipient governments, and seen as in lieu 
of taxation (Gupta et al., 2004; Benedek et al., 2012). Although researchers have suggested that 
concessional loans are positively related to revenue performance, excessive reliance on foreign 
loans may lead to problems of debt sustainability in the long run. 
Foreign aid is provided to recipient countries through governments’ fiscal budgets, either as 
project support or budget support. Project support implies that the funds are earmarked for a 
particular project that is agreed upon by both the donor and the recipient country. Foreign aid 
requires a high level of accountability and achievement of deliverables, and may run for a few 
years. On the other hand, if given as budget support, funds are channeled into the national 
treasury. Decisions on spending are unrestricted by the donor and only depend on the country’s 
list of priorities. In the past, most aid was provided in the form of project support. Currently, 
however, more aid is provided in the form of budget support, and the recipient countries are 
granted more autonomy in spending it. 
The primary objective of donors in channeling foreign aid to African and other developing 
countries is to boost economic development. Statistics show that African countries receive the 
highest amount of foreign aid relative to GDP in the world, but the results appear to be dismal. 
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Something seems to be going wrong with donor aid, which raises numerous interesting 
questions. One of the questions we must ask in this regard is: Which are the critical sources of 
effective and sustainable development funding—foreign inflows or domestic revenue 
mobilization? 
In 2002, the Monterrey Consensus highlighted the importance of mobilizing domestic 
resources to finance the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and since then, the donor 
community has increasingly acknowledged the importance of Domestic Revenue Mobilization 
(DRM), for example, through the support of African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) 
initiatives. Increasing domestic revenue mobilization was emphasized again during the 
formulation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which include an end to poverty, 
less inequality, and combatting injustice, as well as dealing with climate change, by 2030. 
World leaders of the UN endorsed the SDGs as the underlying development goals for the next 
generation. These goals can be achieved faster if developing countries receive the needed 
development financing. Increasing domestic revenue creates additional fiscal space for 
supporting country’s important projects. It also allows a country to maintain spending levels 
consistent with its policy priorities when aid is phased out. Part of this strategy is improving 
tax system administration by developing a simple, fair and efficient tax system. As low-income 
countries in Africa transit into emerging market countries, they need to also strengthen their 
revenue collection to sustain higher tax burdens. At the same time, volatility and uncertainty 
of aid flows can adversely impact budgetary management in the recipient countries. Increasing 
domestic revenue is the best way to mitigate such effects and create a more stable and reliable 
revenue stream (Sanjeey Gupta and Shamsuddin Tareq, 2008). 
The global financial crisis (2008-9) made it clear that Africa was overly dependent on external 
aid flows. Foreign aid was one of the first items to be cut in donors’ budgets, which hit low- 
income African countries very hard. This made it increasingly clear that foreign aid was an 
undependable source of government revenue due to its uncertainty and volatility. Furthermore, 
over-dependence on grant aid leads developing countries to postpone reaching their full tax- 
collection potential (Gupta 2003). 
Domestic revenue mobilization, mostly in the form of taxation, offers the potential for 
achieving greater independence and sustainable economic growth and development. Taxation 
reduces over-dependence on aid. It also reinforces social contracts between the state and its 
citizens, which foster accountability by the government. According to the African Economic 
Outlook (AEO, 2010), Africa’s average tax revenue as a share of GDP has been increasing 
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since the 1990s. However, this increase was mostly due to taxes on the extraction of natural 
resources, which does not require as much government accountability as other forms of taxes. 
Resource taxation has not appeared to offer a stable tax base to African countries. According 
to the IMF (IMF, 2007), countries that rely substantially on taxes from income, profit, and 
capital gains, expand revenue performance more than countries that depend on taxes from 
goods and services. 
Many African countries are endowed with natural resources, but their governments have failed 
to use them to their advantage. This is largely because of poor governance and political 
instability. However, if foreign aid can be used to improve institutions, this could improve 
economic growth. , These improvements could include establishing efficient, effective and fair 
tax systems, and better government for its citizens. 
1.1 Trends in African Taxation and Foreign Aid 
 
Despite development challenges, most African countries have shown an improvement in DRM 
(excluding grants) since 2003, as shown in (Figure 1-1). This is constant, apart from a 
significant drop in 2009, which was a result of the Global financial crisis. 
 
 


























































































































The 42 Sub-Saharan Africa countries covered in our study show an average tax revenue of 12% 
of GDP (Figure 1-2) over the past 25 years. However, it is important to note that there are a 
large number of countries with tax levels above 20% of GDP. On the other hand, governments’ 
final consumption expenditures averaged 15% of GDP (Figure 1-3 & Figure 1-4), which 
highlights the importance of foreign aid and domestic borrowing for them. 
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Source. GFS and IMF country reports 
 
 
Average Central Government final consumption Expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
These expenditures are consumed within the current year and are mainly made up of recurrent 
expenditures which are essential in responding to community needs. They exclude military and 
capital expenditure, which are huge. Governments fund expenditure with revenue from taxes, 
seigniorage, borrowing, and foreign aid. We observe that average final consumption 
expenditures, 15% of GDP, are greater than the average tax revenue, 12% of GDP. Which 
indicates that tax collection in Sub-Saharan Africa is lower than expenditure demands. 
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Source: World Bank national accounts, and OECD National Accounts data 
 
 
Average Tax in Oil Exporting Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
According to the literature, oil-rich countries pay less attention to tax collection because of an 
overemphasis on oil-related sources of revenue, which is linked to less accountability to 
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citizens who demand social developments in exchange for their money. Some of these 
countries are upper-middle income countries such as Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea, which 
have an average tax revenue of 7% of GDP (Figure 1-5), which is lower than the average tax 
revenue in both low-income (10% of GDP) and lower-middle income countries (12% of 
GDP).1 This demonstrates the resource curse, since more developed countries are expected to 
collect more tax, which is not the case with oil-rich countries. 
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Performance of different taxes 
 
Studies confirm that Africa’s largest source of revenue is resource rents, obviously from 
resource-rich countries. Thomas (2013), analyzes the relationship between non-resource tax 
revenue and resource revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa. They determine that a higher resource 
revenue-to-GDP ratio has a negative effect on non-resource revenue, implying low tax efforts. 
They argue that most of these resource-rich countries have weak institutions, which encourages 
tax evasion and high levels of corruption. (Figure 1-6) shows that resource revenue is high in 
Africa, implying that tax efforts are relatively low. Resource-rich countries in this group could 
perform much better economically if other forms of taxes are given more attention in the 





1 These countries collect non-tax revenue in the form of royalties and dividends 
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Figure 1-6: Performance of Different Taxes 
 




1.2 Disaggregation of Foreign Aid into Concessional Loans and Grants 
 
The high average levels of grants (Figure 1-7), 77% of GDP, for the 42 Sub-Saharan 
countries we examine can be explained by the fact that most of the poor countries receive 
foreign aid in the form of grants, since they are not eligible for loans, which need repayment. 
Additionally, some of the Sub-Saharan countries are classified under fragile countries and 
they frequently receive humanitarian grants, especially during civil wars and severe droughts. 
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Source: OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 
 
Net concessional loans constitute an average of 9.3 percent of GDP per annum for the 42 
Sub-Saharan countries over the 25-year period. (Figure 1-8) 
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1.3 Challenges Facing Developing Countries 
 
Developing countries have weak systems of financial management. Thus, the challenges for 
increasing revenue collection include such things as tax avoidance, tax evasion, out-dated tax 
systems, unskilled tax collectors, and high rates of corruption.      Moreover, there is a lack of 
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oversight on how the collected revenue is spent for sustainable development. In short, there is 
lack of accountability from governments. 
African countries often face problems of poor governance and political instability. Although 
most African countries are endowed with natural resources, they may fail to garner the full 
benefits under such circumstances. If foreign aid can be channelled towards upgrading 
institutions, this can revitalize domestic revenue mobilization and improve governance and 
political accountability. In this case, foreign aid to Africa would have a long-term positive 
impact on DRM. 
1.4 Research Focus 
 
Objective of the Thesis 
This study focuses on the impact of foreign loans and grants on tax revenues of 42 Sub-Saharan 
African countries for the period 1990-2014. Using this panel, we test the hypothesis that loans 
have a positive effect on taxation revenue because of the obligation to repay them, whereas 
grants have a negative effect because the recipient treats them as free money, and as a substitute 
for taxation. 
We begin with a basic model for predicting taxation revenue, and then consider the role of 
loans and grants. We try to account for underlying structural differences among countries by 
analyzing countries classified in different income levels separately. 
Contribution to Literature 
The findings of our research contribute to the existing literature by, firstly, making use of the 
most recent data. Secondly, we control for structural differences. Lastly, we control for tax 
collection ability using tertiary school enrolment (% gross) as a proxy for skilled tax collectors. 
Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the relationship 
of foreign aid compositions, concessional loans, and grants, to tax revenue. In this section, we 
further review the effect of foreign aid on institutions, fiscal behavior and economic growth. 
Section 3 outlines the methodology and data sources. Section 4 presents empirical results and 





2 Review of the Literature 
 
Government expenditures are financed through three key sources of revenue; foreign aid 
(grants and concessional loans), tax revenue and not-tax revenue for resource-rich countries, 
and borrowing (both domestic and foreign). In our literature review, we examine studies on the 
impact of foreign aid on taxation, institutions, and fiscal and overall economic growth. The 
literature on the impact of foreign aid on institutions, fiscal behavior and economic growth is 
covered, since any shock on taxation revenue has leakages effects on these sectors. 
2.1 Impact of Foreign Aid on Taxation 
 
For sustainable development to be attained, especially in developing countries, governments 
should invest heavily in improving tax administration systems to increase revenue from 
taxation. Heavy dependence on foreign aid tends to hinder the development of major projects 
because of the volatile nature of this aid. Domestic revenue is more stable, however, and 
possible to predict, and therefore allows for appropriate planning. It is therefore of paramount 
importance that developing countries attain sustainable and stable levels of taxation to fund 
their growing government expenditure. 
Inflow of Foreign aid to developing countries have increased in recently to finance the growing 
share of recurrent expenditures. Although recipient countries are expected to supplement the 
inflows by increasing domestic tax revenues, the record shows that this has not been the case 
with most African countries. Some theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that an increase 
in foreign aid inflow might reduce effort in revenue collection. 
 
Gupta et al. (2004) analyzes the impact of foreign aid on tax revenue in 107 countries in the 
period 1970 to 2000. They investigate the impact of grants and loans on domestic revenue 
mobilization, alongside other structural variables. They find out that concessional loans are 
positively related to tax revenue, while grants are negatively related. Furthermore, total foreign 
aid is found to impact domestic revenue mobilization negatively. This implies that the negative 
effect from grants outweighs the positive effect from loans, and the overall effect becomes 
negative. 
Gupta et al. (2004) further argue that the effects of foreign aid on domestic revenue are country 
specific. The reduction of revenue in some countries arises as a result of increases in   foreign 
11  
aid through the tendency of recipient governments to return resources to the private sector by 
reducing the tax burden on citizens, to accelerate economic growth. Corruption is used as a 
proxy for institutional development, whereby, governments in countries with high levels of 
corruption will respond to an increase in foreign aid by offsetting tax revenue fully. Gupta et 
al. (2004) estimate the following model: 
 
log[𝑇𝑎𝑥⁄𝐺𝐷𝑃] = β + β1AGR + β2IND + β3TRADE + β4INCOME +   β5Grants 0 
+ β 6Grants2  + β 7Loans + β 8Loans2  + ε  
(2-1) 
** Time and country subscripts omitted 
 
Where Tax (% of GDP) represents tax revenue, AGR (% of GDP) represents agricultural 
sector, IND (% of GDP) represents the industrial sector, Trade (% of GDP) represents trade 
openness, INCOME represents real GDP per capita, which is a proxy for level of development, 
and, finally Grants and Loans, which make up foreign aid flows. The squared terms are 
included to capture nonlinear effects. The study further finds that agriculture has statistically 
significant negative effects on tax revenue. Gupta et al. (2004) argue that it’s difficult to tax 
agricultural activities since most of the transactions are carried out informally and mostly 
practiced at subsistence level especially in low-income and lower-middle income countries. 
The impact of industry on tax revenue was positive. This is supported by the fact that it’s easy 
to levy tax due existence of well-kept books of accounts. Increase in GDP per capita has a 
negative impact on tax revenue which is an unexpected outcome. Income per person was used 
as a proxy for level of development, and more developed countries are expected to raise more 
revenue through taxation. Trade impacts tax collection positively, since transactions take place 
at a specific point making it easier to levy taxes. There is also an argument that shortages in 
mobilization of domestic revenue my trigger foreign aid inflows, suggesting the presence of 
reverse causality between tax revenue and foreign aid. Gupta, et al used one period lags for 
loans and grants as instrument variables in the study, to solve endogeneity problem. 
Benedek et al. (2012), responded to critiques of Gupta et al. (2004) by re-examining the 
relationship between aid and domestic tax revenue in 118 countries for the period 1980-2009, 
with a focus on the countries’ income levels: low-income, lower middle income, and upper 
middle income. They estimated the Two-way Error Correction Model in the equation (2-2). 
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log[Tax⁄GDP] = β  + β 1AGRit  + β 2INDit  + β 3TRADEit      + β 4INCOMEit 0 
2 
+ β 5ODA_Grants + β 6(ODAGrantsit)   + β 7ODALoansit 





These variables are the same as those used by Gupta, et al. (2004). 𝑎𝑖 and 𝜇𝑡 represent country 
and time specific effects respectively. 
The findings of their research support the results presented by Gupta, et al. (2004) of a negative 
effect on tax revenue from grants and total aid, as well as a positive relationship between 
concessional loans and tax revenue. The negative correlation was stronger in low-income 
countries. They further disaggregate tax data into VAT, income, excise, and trade taxes and 
establish that trade taxes have a positive relationship with ODA grants, whereas other taxes 
maintained a negative correlation. The positive effect from trade taxes is explained by 
increased imports, which accompany a rise in external grants. The negative impact on other 
forms of taxes such as VAT can be explained by the fact that increased imports are not taxed 
VAT which is added at the production stage and final sale of goods and services produced 
locally. Countries with weak institutions, that is, more corrupt, are more affected by a rise in 
grants which drastically lower levels of tax revenue. Benedek, et al. (2012) also note that the 
impact of grants on tax revenue has been weakening over time. Gupta et al. (2004) finds an 
offset of the total revenue of about 28 cents for every additional dollar of grants, whereas they 
find an offset of 9 cents for every additional dollar in grants. 
Clist and Morrissey (2011) build on the model of Gupta et al. (2004) by examining the impact 
of foreign aid (loans and grants) on tax efforts in 82 developing countries during 1970-2005. 
Their study analyzes two sets of data, from 1970-1984 and 1985-2005 separately. They further 
classify countries into two income groups: Lower-middle income and low-income. The 
findings for the first set of data show that loans are positively related to tax revenue, while 
grants have a negative relationship with tax revenue. The second set of data, 1985-2005, 
indicate that grants are positively related to tax revenue, but this is only significant in middle- 
income countries. The argument supporting a positive relationship is attached to conditional 
lending, which became popular in the mid-1980s and only significant in middle-income 
countries. This is because middle-income countries had better fiscal systems than low-income 
countries, which had a limited tax base and weak fiscal systems. The study examined the effect 
of import taxes separately from that of export taxes. It was evident that import taxes were 
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positively related to tax revenue, as most of the countries, and especially the low-income 
countries depend heavily on imports, which are taxed at the border. Export taxes had a negative 
relationship to tax revenue, which the paper indicated was an unexpected outcome. This might 
be a result of the reduction or elimination of export taxes in the 1980s in most countries. It 
could also result from the establishment of Export Processing Zones (EPZ), where investors 
are given long tax holidays, especially in developing countries, to attract investors for 
industrialization visions. It is clear that poor countries have limited ability to expand tax 
revenue and therefore they receive more aid, mostly in the form of grants, since they are fiscally 
constrained and the donor community may not wish to expose them to enormous debt burdens. 
This implies that, for poor countries with low levels of tax revenue, any increase in aid flow 
will impact negatively on tax revenue, because the more grants they receive, the more they 
lower taxes. There is thus an automatic-negative contemporaneous effect between grants and 
tax revenue. Clist and Morrissey (2009) estimated the following model in their analysis. 
 
log[𝑇𝑎𝑥⁄𝐺𝐷𝑃] = β + β1AGR + β2IND + β3M + 𝛽4X + β5GDP +   β6GDP
2 
0 
+ β 7Grants + β 8Grants2  + β 9Loans + β 10Loans2  + ε  
(2-3) 
** Time and country subscripts omitted 
 
However, the findings of Benedek et al. (2012) have been challenged by Clist (2016), who 
attempted to reproduce the model unsuccessfully. Clist (2016) failed to replicate Benedek’s 
results, even using the same data and attributes this to the use of different data in constructing 
variables, mainly dependent variables, without checking data compatibility. Clist, P. (2016) 
blames these inconsistencies on the different datasets used by Benedek, et al, and states that 
coefficient estimates are not robust to different sources of data. 
 
Patrick Carter (2013) criticizes studies which suggest that foreign aid in the form of grants has 
a negative impact on revenue mobilization. He claims that these studies use simple, static 
models and strong econometric assumptions. He states that the results found in these studies 
disappear or become insignificance when more general econometric methods are used to 
analyze the same data. Carter estimates the relationship between foreign aid and tax revenue 
using data from Gupta et al. (2004) and Remmer (2004). He applies panel time series estimators 
in his analysis and finds no evidence to support the taxation and foreign aid relationship. He 
argues that the increased positive impact of grants on tax revenue is a result of increased 
awareness of and emphasis by the donor community on the importance of domestic revenue 
mobilization for sustainable economic development. 
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Hisali & Ddumba-Ssentamu, (2013) find that grants have a negative effect on tax revenue in 
Uganda, which is offset by the positive impact of loans. This is unlike Benedek, et al. (2012) 
and Gupta, et al. (2004) who find the positive effect of loans being offset by the negative effect 
of grants, and hence the overall negative effect of total foreign aid. As a result, total aid leads 
to a modest increase in tax revenue in the long-run. According to theory, a higher GDP per 
capita should translate to more tax collection. However, a study by Hisali & Ddumba-Ssentamu 
(2013) argues that the negative relationship between GDP per capita and tax revenue is a result 
of noncompliance from taxpayers. These results suggest that the wealthy individuals practice 
tax avoidance and evasion. There is therefore a need for development in tax systems. 
Chaudhry & Munir (2010) research factors contributing to low levels of tax revenue in 
Pakistan. Their fiscal model incorporates income, economic policies, external, and social 
factors. Foreign aid is one of the external variables, along with external debts and foreign 
remittances. Their study finds out that foreign aid has a negative relationship to tax collection 
in Pakistan, but the variable was statistically insignificant. Their baseline model uses a lagged 
variable of tax-to-GDP ratio to capture dynamic effects in the country, and to solve 
autocorrelation problems in the model. 
Thornton (2014) critiques findings in the literature by claiming that that the presence of 
endogeneity and heterogeneity problems might have biased the results of these studies. 
Thornton (2014) uses distance between the recipient and the donor, former colony, and religion 
as instrumental variables to solve identified problems. The findings of the study are similar to 
those in other studies, but his research shows that OLS estimates are biased downwards due to 
the presence of endogeneity. This shows that the literature has generally underreported the 
effect of foreign aid on tax revenue. 
 
 
2.2 Impact of Foreign Aid on Institutions 
 
Africa, as a continent, is one of the largest recipient of foreign aid in the world, and the least 
democratic. This leads us to question of foreign aid hurts Africa and if the receipt of foreign 
aid is a curse. Djankov et al. (2008) study 108 foreign aid recipient countries from 1960 to 
1999. Their study focuses on establishing the impact of foreign aid on institutions in the 
beneficiary countries. Democracy is used as a proxy for institutional development. Their 
results show that countries which receive more foreign aid have lower levels of democracy 
than counterparts who receive less foreign aid. Increased aid to these countries leads to worse 
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political institutions, which further results in rent-seeking by corrupt government officials, as 
observed in resource-rich countries. This is similar to the role of natural resources which fuel 
rent-seeking behavior. This only comes into play when institutions are weak. Djankov, et al. 
(2008) conclude that foreign aid has a negative impact on institutions and suggests the need 
for further probe investigation of this negative correlation. 
In addition to determinants of tax efforts used in the literature, Antonio and Carlos (2011) add 
income distribution into their regression. They used the Gini index as a proxy for income 
distribution in countries where they identify a zero effect of foreign aid on tax revenue. They 
discover a statistically significant negative effect of aid on tax revenue whenever the Gini index 
is excluded from the model using IV and RE, and a positive impact using sys-GMM. This 
shows that omission of the income distribution variable can lead to biased results. Scholars 
have argued that the impact of foreign aid on tax revenue is pegged on the quality of 
institutions, where aid fuels tax collection in countries with good institutions and induces tax- 
cuts where institutions are weak. Antonio and Carlos (2011) control for institutional quality 
and still find that aid does not seem to have any effect on tax revenue. They therefore conclude 
that, irrespective of the quality of a country’s institutions , aid does not affect tax revenue. This 
is contrary to Gupta, et al. (2003), Brun, et al. (2007)  and Azam, et al. (1999) who find that  
in more corrupt countries (those with weak institutions) foreign aid results in tax-cuts. 
Bräutigam & Knack, (2004) review the impact of large amounts of aid on African countries 
with poor governance records, and how they are delivered. The outcome of their study shows 
the link between foreign aid and governance in sub-Saharan African countries. Their research 
provides evidence of deterioration in governance in African countries as a result of increased 
aid. They conclude that improvement in governance results in increased GDP per capita, and 
that there is a strong relationship between increase in foreign aid and lower tax revenue. Their 
suggestions for solutions to these problems include, firstly, that disbursement of foreign aid 
should be targeted to governments with proven records of developmental governance. 
Secondly, they suggest that programs which involve huge levels of aid, should be provided 
only as a short-term development tool. 
2.3 Impact of Foreign Aid on Fiscal Components 
 
Osei, et al. (2005) use Vector Autoregressive (VAR) methods to establish cointegration among 
nonstationary fiscal variables to investigate the impact of foreign aid on the national budget of 
Ghana. The fiscal response model includes variables for government spending, tax    revenue, 
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aid finance, and domestic borrowing. Impulse response analysis shows fiscal variables are 
cointegrated, and further shows that, in Ghana, aid leads to an increase in government spending, 
an increase in tax effort, and reduced domestic borrowing. Franco-Rodriguez, et al. (1998) find 
that, in Pakistan, the total impact of aid on consumption was negative, despite the allocation of 
almost half of total aid to government consumption. The impact of aid on governance was 
slightly positive, but there was a negative effect on total public expenditure and taxation. 
Studies on aid and government fiscal behavior by Oliver Morrissey (2014) show that aid did 
not have a significant effect on tax revenue until the 1980s when a positive relationship was 
observed. This led, to reductions in domestic borrowing which is a requirement of the IMF. 
Bazoumana Ouattara (2006) find that almost 41% of aid flows to Senegal is used to finance the 
country’s debt. The research further establishes the existence of a negative relationship between 
aid and government revenue, and an insignificant effect on domestic expenditure and 
borrowing. Batten, (2010) analyze the interplay between foreign aid and fiscal behavior in 
Papua New Guinea, where aid grants lead to lower tax revenue and reduced domestic 
borrowing. 
Ghura, (1998) carry out a study on the determinants of tax revenue by focusing on the effect 
of economic policies and corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. They find that the implementation 
of structural reforms is positively correlated to tax revenue, and an increase in grants results in 
a reduction in tax revenue. Corruption is also captured in their model, among other variables, 
and the analysis reveals that the presence of corruption reduced tax revenue. 
Bhushan & Samy (2014) undertake a case study of four countries: Bolivia, Uganda, Guatemala, 
and Zimbabwe, to examine the impact of fiscal capacity and performance on aid allocation. It 
is evident from their research that both bilateral and multilateral donors, despite endless 
emphasis on domestic revenue mobilization, pay little attention to fiscal capacity and 
performance during aid allocation 
Salih, (2012) analyzes the impact of foreign aid on the public sector in East Africa, and their 
results show that aid has a positive impact on both public investment and recurrent government 
expenditure. The study further argues that aid is negatively related to taxation and domestic 
borrowing. 
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2.4 Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth 
 
Studies on the effectiveness of foreign aid in developing countries do not agree on whether aid 
impacts economic growth positively or negatively. Arguments for and against foreign aid to 
developing countries have been put forward by different researchers. 
Quazi, (2005) carries out a case study by estimating two models, an Aid-Growth model and an 
Aid-Fiscal model, to analyze the impact of foreign aid on economic growth and fiscal behavior 
in Bangladesh. Their results show that total foreign aid has a marginal effect on the economic 
growth of Bangladesh. Disaggregating foreign aid into loans and grants reveals that grants are 
associated with a statistically insignificant effect on growth, whereas loans lead to GDP growth 
in Bangladesh. In the fiscal model, aid loans are related to increased tax revenue, since they 
mostly finance productive projects, unlike aid grants, which finance non-productive public 
expenditures, and therefore have a negative impact on tax revenue. 
Ekanayake & Chatrna (2009), analyse foreign aid data covering 85 recipient countries in Asia, 
Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America during 1980-2007 to investigate the effect of foreign 
aid on economic growth. Estimations from their model imply that foreign aid has mixed effects 
on economic growth in developing countries. For example, there is a positive correlation 
between foreign aid and economic growth in Africa, but a negative correlation in other regions. 
The study further groups countries according to their income levels, that is, Low-Income 
Countries, Lower-middle-Income Countries, Upper-Middle-Income Countries, and High- 
Income Countries. In the case study, foreign aid had a positive impact on growth in countries 
in all income groups except for Lower-middle-Income countries, where economic growth was 
negatively affected by the inflow of foreign aid. Aye Mengistu Alemu and Jin-Sang Lee (2015) 
find a positive relationship between economic growth and foreign aid in low-income countries 
in Africa while they find a negative relationship in middle-income countries, also in Africa. 
They further concluded that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) impacted positively on the 
economies of middle-income countries. 
Chervin & van Wijnbergen, (2010) focus on how volatility in foreign aid affects the economic 
growth of 155 countries, over the period 1966-2001. The results suggest that volatility in 
foreign aid has a negative effect on economic growth. However when this volatility is 
controlled, foreign aid has a positive impact on economic growth. Asteriou, (2009) finds a 
positive relationship between aid and economic growth in five South Asian countries. The 
study used panel data analysis to establish the long-run and short-run relationships between 
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foreign aid and economic growth. They claim robust estimates as a result of using a panel unit 
root test, mean group and a pooled mean group, which are robust for panel data econometrics. 
A study by Ndambendia & Njoupouognigni, (2010) on the impact of foreign aid and foreign 
direct investment on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa shows a positive relationship, 
but with a very low coefficient for foreign aid. 
According to Islam, (1992), statistics on the inflow of foreign aid show that although 
Bangladesh is a recipient of one of the largest allocations of foreign aid, it remains amongst 
the poorest countries in the world. Foreign aid to the country aims to boost economic growth, 
but domestic resources impact more positively on economic growth than foreign aid The study 
further notes that foreign aid in the form of loans are preferred to grants. 
Poverty levels are high in most African countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mallik, 
(2008) analysed six of the poorest African Countries, Central Africa Republic, Malawi, Mali, 
Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo . These countries have had either declining or stagnant real GDP 
per capita despite receiving foreign aid. Cointegration analysis in the study shows a negative 
long-run relationship between aid and economic growth in five out of the six countries. In the 
short-run, foreign aid has no significant effect on growth except in Niger. 
Contrary to some findings on the effect of foreign aid on economies of developing countries, 
(Karras, 2006) find a positive statistically significant relationship between foreign aid and 
economic growth in 71 developing economies. The results did not control for fiscal policies. 
Karras, (2006) shows that 1 percent increase in foreign aid raises per capita growth by 
approximately 0.14 to 0.26 percent. 
Kim, (2011) analyses the success story of South Korea, which moved from being a foreign aid 
recipient to being a donor. Foreign aid greatly supported the economic development of South 
Korea. The research considered the two government regimes in Korea, the first regime full of 
corrupt and incompetent officials, and the second more economic development oriented, with 
high levels of government capacity, commitment, and ownership. Kim, (2011) conclude that 
good governance and financial support from the USA as the main donor fuelled the Korean 
economy. 
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Table 2-1: Summary of findings from the Empirical Literature 
 
Author(s) No. of Countries Panel/Time 
series 
Agr Ind GDPP Trade Total 
Aid 
Grants Loans 
Gupta et al 
(2004) 
107 Panel - + - + - - + 
Benedek et 
al (2012), 




82 Panel - + -/+ M=+ 
X=- 





1 Time series N.I.M N.I.M - N.I.M + - + 
Thornton, 
(2014) 
93 Panel - + + + - - + 
Clist & Morrissey (2011) find different signs when different samples are used, that is, those for 1970- 
1984 and 1985-2005. They also concludes that GDP per capita affects tax revenue positively when its 
squared value is included in the model, and negatively when this value is excluded. N.I.M denotes not 




3 Methodology and Data 
 
This study focuses on the panel time series analysis of 42 Sub-Saharan African countries for 
the period 1990-2014 (see Appendix A, Table A-1). We focus on the 42 countries because of 
data availability, and because they are among the largest recipients of foreign aid, especially in 
the form of grants. Estimation of models is carried out by employing annual panel data. 
3.1 Model Specification 
 
Our study entails determining the impact of foreign aid on tax revenue. We begin by estimating 
two models. One includes net foreign aid, among other control variables (Equation 3-2). The 
other disaggregates foreign aid into grants and concessional loans (Equation 3-1). 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔   
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡    ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼    + 𝛽  𝐼𝑁𝐷    + 𝛽  𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸    + 𝛽 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃 
( 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖𝑡 1 𝑖𝑡 2 𝑖𝑡 3 𝑖𝑡 4 𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃2 +𝛽6𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽7𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 





𝐿𝑜𝑔   
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡    ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼    + 𝛽  𝐼𝑁𝐷    + 𝛽  𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸    + 𝛽 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃 
( 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖𝑡 1 𝑖𝑡 2 𝑖𝑡 3 𝑖𝑡 4 𝑖𝑡 






Our model of interest captures the impact of grants and loans on tax revenue. We estimate the 
model in equation (3-1), by regressing tax revenue (% of GDP) on its determinants, which are: 
Agriculture – value added (AGRI), Industry – value added (IND), GDP per capita (GDPP), 
Trade openness (TRADE), ODA-Grants and ODA-Netloans. Nonlinear effects are captured by 
including a squared value of GDP per capita in the model. We estimate equation (3-1) and (3- 
2) using a Fixed Effects estimator that takes into account unobservable country specific effects, 
and which is time invariant and helps to explain differences in cross-country tax revenue. 
We are employing a one-way error component model, which allows for cross-section 
heterogeneity in the error term. This is because a two-way error component model is not 
supported in Eviews® with an unbalanced panel. Our unbalanced panel is the result of missing 
data. We further hold strongly that a Fixed Effects estimator is more appropriate, since some 
econometrically  unobservable  factors  which  are  country  specific  might  influence  the tax 
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collection. For example, management skills of the policy makers may have this effect. In 
contrast, a Random Effect estimator assumes unobserved country heterogeneity to be random 
such  that: 𝛼𝑖  = 𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎2) and 𝜇𝑖𝑡  = 𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎2), which  further  assumes  strict exogeneity in 
𝛼 𝜇 
explanatory variables of unobserved country heterogeneity and idiosyncratic errors. 
 
Unlike random effects, Fixed Effects allow unobserved country heterogeneity to be correlated 
with explanatory variables, but assumes strict exogeneity in all explanatory variables 
conditional on idiosyncratic error. However, since it is difficult to find appropriate observable 
and nonzero instrument variables to control for the unobserved heterogeneity, the fixed effect 
estimator wipes out unobservable country effects by demeaning the variables using within 
transformation. It then estimates the model by OLS, assuming all the explanatory variables are 
exogenous, i.e., (𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝜇𝑖𝑡) = 0, where  𝑡 = 1 … . 𝑇 and   = 1 … . 𝑁 
3.2 Data 
 
All data used was obtained from reliable secondary sources (Table 3-1). Taxation revenue (% 
of GDP) data was obtained from the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics (GFS), and IMF 
specific country reports, to fill in the gaps. Taxation revenue refers to compulsory transfers to 
the private sector and to the central government for public transactions which exclude social 
contributions. Foreign Aid/Official Development Assistance (ODA) data was obtained from 
the OECD’s Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients dataset. It is the 
sum of all aid from bilateral and multilateral donors and includes grants and concessional loans. 
Grants represent transfers to recipient countries with no repayment obligation, and 
concessional loans represent transfers with a grant element of 25 percent or more. 
Table 3-1: Variables used 
 
Variable Measure Source of Data Unit Root test 
Agriculture – value 
added 
% of GDP World Bank’s WDI 
Database 
Stationary I (0) 
Industry – value added % of GDP World Bank’s WDI 
Database 
Stationary I (0) 
Trade (Imports + 
Exports) 
% of GDP World Bank’s WDI 
Database 
Stationary I (0) 















% gross school 
enrolments 




Corruption Index  ICRG and PRS  
Tax Revenue % of GDP IMF’s   GFS   &   IMF 
country reports 
Stationary I (0) 
ODA_grants % of GDP OECD database Stationary I (0) 
ODA_loans % of GDP OECD database Stationary I (0) 
ODA_aid % of GDP OECD database Stationary I (0) 
Government 
Expenditure 
% of GDP World Bank’s WDI 
Database 
Stationary I (0) 
Source: Author 
All variables are measured yearly. I (0) means the variable is stationary at level and I (1) means the 
variable is non-stationary at level, but becomes stationary after first difference. 
 
 
Description of Other Variables 
 
All variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP to capture their relative sizes except GDP 
per capita (GDP/population) and tertiary school enrolment which is expressed as a percentage 
of gross school enrolment. 
Agriculture valued added represent the net output of the sector after adding up all the outputs 
and subtracting intermediate inputs. Industry, like agriculture, captures the net output, after 
subtracting intermediate inputs from the total output of the sector. Trade openness is captured 
by the sum of imports and exports of goods and services. Agriculture, industry, and trade 
openness are used to control for the economy’s structure. GDP per capita, which captures 
income per person in the economy, is used as a proxy for the level of economic development. 
Agriculture, industry, and trade openness are used to control for the economic structure 
Oil rent represents the net value of crude oil production at world prices less total cost of 
production, calculated by the World Bank. 
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3.2.1 Stationarity of Data 
 
The Unit root test determines whether a series is stationary or non-stationary (See Table 3-1). 
ADF-Fisher (ADF) and Phillips-Perron-Fisher (PP) test statistics are used. All test equations 
include individual intercepts, individual intercepts and trends, or none. The test shows that 
agriculture, loans, and total aid are stationary in level when test equations include individual 
intercepts, individual intercepts and trends, or none. Industry, trade, grants, and tax revenue are 
stationary in level when test equations include individual intercepts, and individual intercepts 
and trends only. Being stationary in original specification means that variables are integrated 
of order zero, I (0). GDP per capita, oil and tertiary school enrollment are non-stationary in 
level but become stationary when first-differenced. This implies they are integrated of order 
one, I (1). The majority of variables are therefore stationary in level, I (0), and are the variables 
included in the baseline model (control variable) and our variable of interest, tax revenue. 
(Table C-1) presents the statistical tests of all variables used in the model. 
3.2.2 Long run Relationship 
 
A cointegration test is undertaken to investigate variables’ long run relationship. Non- 
stationary variables can be converted to stationary variables through differencing. The unit 
root test shows that GDP per capita, oil, and tertiary school enrollment are integrated of order 
one, I (1). A Cointegration test is carried out to ensure that the three I (1) variables are 
cointegrated before they are included in the model, and, since they are integrated of the same 
order, the Fisher-Johansen Cointegration test is applied. Table 3-2 shows that the three 
variables are cointegrated, meaning that they have a long-run relationship. Additionally, it 
implies that a linear combination of the three I (1) variables is integrated of order zero, I (0), 
consequently, they can be included in the model without generation of spurious results. 
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Note: ***represent significance at 1%. We reject the null hypothesis that none of our equations are 
cointegrated. 
 
When variables are cointegrated, we can establish steady state equilibrium, and the absence of 
cointegrating equations (when dealing with non-stationary variables) may potentially result to 
spurious results, and wrong inferences. In our case, we carry out a Johansen cointegration test 
of the three I (1) variables only (see Table 3-2), and test for long run relationships/cointegration 
of all the variables in the model. An Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model can be 
applied, since it allows a cointegration test involving variables integrated of different orders- 
i.e., I (0) and I (1) but not I (2) (See Table C-2, Table C-3, Table C-4, Table C-5& Table C-6). 
3.3 Estimation Methods 
 
In our model specification, one of the challenges of estimating the impact of foreign aid on 
taxation revenue is the possibility of reverse causality. That is, that donors may effect foreign 
aid depending on the levels of domestic revenue mobilization in the recipient countries. For 
example, donors may increase foreign grants because of a reduction in domestic revenue. 
Similarly, donors may increase foreign loans to countries that have shown an increase in 
collection of domestic revenue. The practice of giving grants to poor countries and loans to 
countries with steady tax revenue is necessitated because poor countries have no financial 
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muscle to repay loans. Moreover, most evidence points to the fact that aid levels are linked to 
a country’s level of development. 
There is a possibility our models may suffer from an omitted variable, which explains tax effort, 
which may further lead to the presence of impure heteroscedasticity. At the same time, the 
omitted variable may be correlated with some regressors in the model, while being correlated 
with taxation revenue, which will automatically result in endogeneity problems. In our case, 
endogeneity bias may arise due to correction of the independent variable, (foreign aid) with the 
error term, as a result of reverse causality between aid and tax revenue, and/or omitted 
variables, and/or measurement error. This means that OLS estimates would be unbiased but 
standard errors will be biased and inconsistent. We will therefore use Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) estimation to correct for possible endogeneity, and perform feasible generalized least 
squares (FGLS) weights to correct for heteroscedasticity. In addition, we select ‘white cross- 
section’ which assumes errors are cross-sectionally correlated to estimate robust coefficient 
standard errors. To capture dynamic effects of tax revenue and to correct for serial correlation, 
we use one period lag of dependent variable (tax/GDP). We are unable to test for 
autocorrelation, heteroscedastic and cross-sectional dependence because our panel is 
unbalanced. Using the dependent variable lag is therefore part of our diagnostic test for 
autocorrelation. 
 
Problems associated with finding a strong instrumental variable for foreign aid leads us to use 
one period lag of loans, grants and total net aid as the instrumental variables in our model. Both 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects assume strict exogeneity of the instrumental variables 
conditional on unobserved country heterogeneity, i.e.,𝐸(𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝜇𝑖𝑡) = 0, where 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is the 
instrument variable and 𝜇𝑖𝑡  is the unobserved country heterogeneity. 
To account for country heterogeneity effects, we choose a Fixed Effects estimator. However, 
this estimator will be biased due to a potential endogeneity problem. We therefore apply Fixed 
Effects 2SLS estimator which uses one period lag of total aid, grants, and loans as instrumental 
variables. We further compare these with random effects. Our choice of the Fixed Effects 2SLS 
estimator is necessitated by the fact that it does not condition instrumental variables to be 
exogenous like the Random Effects 2SLS. We cannot rely fully on Random Effects 2SLS 
because it is challenging to find strictly exogenous instrumental variables. On the other hand, 
a  Fixed  Effects  2SLS  estimator  assumes  instrumental  variables  are    contemporaneously 
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exogenous, not necessarily strictly exogenous, which is difficult to achieve in our model (see 
Appendix D: Explanation of Estimation Methods) 
In our third model specification in equation (3-2), we introduce tertiary school enrollment as a 
proxy for skills and administrative capacity of tax collectors. More qualified personnel in 
government revenue collection authorities translates to more revenue collection as a result of 
specialised data collection and analysis, and regarding broadening the tax base or increasing 
tax rates. We are aware of no other study in the literature that has controlled for skills and 
ability of tax personnel including education in their model. 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡    ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼    + 𝛽  𝐼𝑁𝐷    + 𝛽  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡    + 𝛽  𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠    + 𝛽 𝑆𝐶𝐻 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖𝑡 1 𝑖𝑡 2 𝑖𝑡 3 𝑖𝑡 4 𝑖𝑡 5 𝑖𝑡 




3.3.2    Expectation of Parameters 
 
Based on the existing literature, we have formulated expectations on our parameters. For 
Agriculture, we expect a negative relationship with tax revenue. This is because most 
agricultural practices in low-income and lower-middle income countries are carried out 
informally or for subsistence purposes and it is extremely hard to levy tax on these. However, 
we expect upper-middle income countries to post a positive relationship between agriculture 
and tax collection. This is because agriculture in these countries is mostly practiced 
commercially and commercial farming ventures will have well-kept records to assist tax 
collection. 
Industry is one of the sectors of the economy where transactions take place in a more formal 
environment, with firms undertaking proper book-keeping. This makes it easier to levy taxes 
on the industrial sector.We therefore expect a positive relationship between industry and tax 
revenue. 
 
GDP per capita is used as a proxy for a country’s income level. Governments of countries in 
the higher income categories collect more taxes. An increase in GDP per capita will eventually 
lead to an increase in tax revenue collection and therefore a positive relationship will be shown 
between per capita GDP and tax revenue. 
 
In our analysis, trade openness constitutes the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services.  Trade transactions are carried out at a specific place, and this makes it easier to levy 
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taxes on trade. This leads to our expectation of a positive relationship between trade openness 
and tax revenue. Governments which are more open to trade internationally, are better 
positioned to increase their tax revenue. 
In line with arguments in the literature, we expect foreign aid in the form of loans will impact 
positively on tax revenue, and foreign aid in the form of grants will lead to a reduction in tax 
revenue. This is because loans carry an obligation to repay, implying the recipient government 
has to maintain current tax revenue levels, or increase them to ensure loan repayments. Grants, 
however, are perceived as a free source of money by recipient governments and may act as a 
substitute to tax revenue. 
 
We introduced a tertiary school enrolment variable into our model, which is a proxy for skills 
in tax collection departments. We would expect countries with more highly-skilled tax 
personnel to have more efficient tax collection systems. 
Our last variable is oil rent (% of GDP), which we expect to have a negative impact on tax 
revenue collection. The explanation for this is that governments in oil-rich countries focus less 




4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
The economies of countries are classified by the World Bank (July 2015) according to their 
income levels, as Low-Income, Lower-Middle-Income Countries, Upper-Middle-Income 
Countries, and High-Income economies. Our analysis focuses on all countries pooled together 
but goes further, to investigate any structural differences related to differences in income levels. 
We begin by considering all 42 countries pooled together and later proceed to assess them 
based on their World Bank income categories. 
4.1 Analysis of all countries 
 
We estimate three models, the first with total foreign aid, the second with grants and loans and 
the third with grants, loans, and tertiary school enrolment. In addition we control for variables 
using Fixed Effects- Estimated General Least Squares (FE-EGLS)) and Fixed Effects-Two 
Stage Least Squares (FE-2SLS). 
This section presents the results obtained by estimating equation (3-1) using FE-EGLS and FE- 
2SLS methods. Our baseline regression in the first model includes control variables, which are 
value-added agriculture as a percentage of GDP, value-added industry as a share of GDP, GDP 
per capita, trade openness (imports plus exports) as a share of GDP, and total foreign aid. The 
second model includes all the control variables in the first model, and further disaggregates 
foreign aid into loans and grants. The third model includes all variables in the second model 
and tertiary school enrolment. 
 
Baseline regression results are provided in (Table 4-1). The structure of the economy, 
represented by agriculture and industry, has a significant impact on our analysis. Agriculture 
has a negative relationship with tax revenue. This relationship meets our initial expectation 
since taxing informal agricultural activities is difficult. On the other hand, industry returns an 
unexpected negative relationship. Taxing the industrial sector is expected to be easy, since 
many businesses operate in the formal sector. These findings may result from long tax holidays 
given to investors in the interest of promoting industry in least industrialized countries, which 
reduce tax collection in these countries. A further possible contributing factor could be transfer 
pricing by multinational companies, which dominate the industrial sector in most Sub-Saharan 
African countries. 
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More importantly, all the control variables are statistically significant. Comparing the control 
variables with those of Gupta, et al. (2004), shows that our GDP per capita analysis solves the 
effect of GDP per capita ambiguity, by reflecting a positive relationship with tax revenue. This 
is contrary to Gupta, et al. (2004), who find an unexpected statistically significant negative 
effect.Their findings might be as a result of model misspecification, since the squared term of 
GDP per capita was excluded in their  model, but included in our model. 
Our model includes the squared term of GDP per capita to capture nonlinear effects, and, an 
increase in GDP per capita contributes positively to tax revenue up to a certain threshold after 
which it declines. We determine the threshold by calculating the GDP per capita turning point 
using the following formula; 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 
̂𝜷𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑷   =0.000266/2(-2.15E-08) = $ 6,186.05 
?̂?𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑷𝟐 
Where by ?̂?4  and ?̂?5  are the estimated coefficients of GDP per capita and squared GDP per 
capita (see equation 3-1). The turning point of GDP per capita when all countries are pooled 
together is $ 6,186.05, which implies that, after this level of income, tax revenue will be 
affected at a decreasing rate. 
 
An increase in total foreign aid (net loans plus grants) is associated with a statistically 
significant drop in taxation revenue. These results agree with previous studies such as Gupta, 
et al. (2004) and Benedek, et al. (2012). When aid is disaggregated into net loans and grants, it 
is evident that both loans and grants have a negative effect on tax revenue, and these are both 
statistically significant. These results suggest that donors indirectly fund tax cuts instead of 
productive government programs, because recipient government practice aid fungibility. Most 
studies find that loans have a positive effect on tax revenue, and the reverse is true for the grants 
(Gupta, et al. (2004), Benedek et al. (2012), Clist and Morrissey (2009)). When we analyse the 
42 countries pooled together, the composition of foreign aid does not matter.That is, grants and 
loans impact negatively on tax revenue, as does total foreign aid. The effects of grants on tax 
revenue is supported by the argument that recipient governments take into account that there 
is no obligation to repay grants On the other hand, loans also have a negative relationship to 
tax revenue in the pooled analysis. We explain our findings by focusing on the frequency of 
debt forgiveness. Most Sub-Saharan African countries are Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC), and they frequently receive debt forgiveness. This may have corrupted any discipline 
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related to repayment as the recipient governments may have formed an expectation of always 
qualifying for debt forgiveness, and perceive loans as equivalent to grants. 
Table 4-1: Baseline Models – Tax Revenue and Foreign Aid 
 
Estimation Method FE- EGLS FE- EGLS Fixed Effects 2SLS Fixed Effects 2SLS 
C 2.587994*** 2.611353*** 2.631084*** 2.891052*** 
 (0.070873) (0.085667) (0.075964) (0.173745) 
AGR -0.011884*** -0.012544*** -0.011613*** -0.011742*** 
 (0.001147) (0.00117) (0.001284) (0.001341) 
GDPP 0.000229*** 0.000273*** 0.000193*** 0.000266*** 
 (2.87E-05) (2.76E-05) (2.28E-05) (2.93E-05) 
GDPP^2 -1.84E-08*** -2.13E-08*** -1.52E-08*** -2.15E-08** 
 (2.35E-09) (2.23E-09) (1.80E-09) (2.36E-09) 
IND -0.006535*** -0.007125*** -0.007124*** -0.007006*** 
 (0.001292) (0.001258) (0.001147) (0.001313) 
TRADE 0.001851*** 0.001817*** 0.001959*** 0.001904*** 
 (0.000363) (0.000356) (0.000325) (0.000385) 
TOTALNET -0.005692***  -0.006497***  
 (0.000867)  (0.001708)  
GRANTS  -0.001253**  -0.004682*** 
  (0.000594)  (0.001845) 
LOANSNET  -0.000716**  -0.004713*** 
  (0.000346)  (0.001585) 
R-squared 0.937029 0.947059 0.943532 0.942383 
F-statistic 259.5792 303.3358 270.2752 293.9313 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 
Cross-Sections 40 40 40 40 
Periods Included 24 24 23 23 
Note: dependent variable is log (taxation revenue/GDP). All regressors are measured as a percentage of GDP except 
GDP per capita. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent respectively. Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) using country Fixed Effects. One period lags of grants, 
loans, and total aid are used as instrument variables. Loans and foreign aid variables capture only the net, not 
gross. Durbin Watson statistics were 0.669672, 0.648589, 0.671142, and 0.815998 for column 1, column 2, column 
3 and column 4 respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Our models indicate that a percentage point increase in agriculture as a share of GDP leads to 
reduction in tax revenue by approximately 1.18% when a Fixed Effect estimator is applied to 
model one and 1.17% when Fixed Effects 2SLS estimator is used. This shows that the two 
estimators produce consistent results. Clist and Morrissey (2011) find 1.16% when current aid 
is used, and 1.17% when lagged aid is used. Gupta, et.al (2004) find a reduction of 1.11% in 
tax revenue, with a one percentage point increase in agriculture as a share of GDP. Clist and 
Morrissey (2011) use a Fixed Effects estimator. Gupta, et.al (2004) use both Fixed Effects and 
Random Effects estimators and their results were similar in both analyses. The three studies 
therefore find a similar negative impact on tax revenue with every one percentage increase in 
agriculture2. 
The signs of the parameters of our key variables (total foreign aid, loans, and grants) differ 
slightly from those of previous studies. The Fixed Effects Estimator shows that a one 
percentage point increase in total foreign aid results in a reduction in tax revenue of 
approximately 0.57%. The Fixed Effects 2SLS estimator shows a reduction of 0.65%, which 
is consistent within two standard errors (2SD). A one percentage point increase in both grants 
and loans reduces tax revenue by 0.47% when an FE-2SLS estimator is applied. 
4.2 Analysis by Income Level 
 
In our analysis, we divide our countries according to the World Bank’s income classifications. 
SSA countries fall into three of the four World Bank categories: Low-income economies, 
lower-middle-income economies, and upper-middle-income economies. We undertake this 
analysis because tax regimes in countries with different income levels may react differently to 
total foreign aid, loans, and grants, owing to structural differences. The first baseline model 
includes all the main control variables and total aid (equation 4-1), and the second baseline 
model contains aid disaggregated into concessional loans and grants (equation 4-2). 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔   
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡    ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼    + 𝛽  𝐼𝑁𝐷    + 𝛽  𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸    + 𝛽 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃 
( 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖𝑡 1 𝑖𝑡 2 𝑖𝑡 3 𝑖𝑡 4 𝑖𝑡 








2 Here we mean the contribution of these - agriculture, industry, trade, grants, loans and foreign/total aid - as a 
percentage of GDP. 
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𝐿𝑜𝑔   
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡    ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼    + 𝛽  𝐼𝑁𝐷    + 𝛽  𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸    + 𝛽 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃 
( 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖𝑡 1 𝑖𝑡 2 𝑖𝑡 3 𝑖𝑡 4 𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃2 +𝛽6𝑂𝐷𝐴_𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽7𝑂𝐷𝐴_𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 
(4-2) 
 
4.2.1 Upper-Middle Income Economies 
 
The results shown in (Table 4-2) are interesting because they differ from those of the pooled 
panel. When agriculture contributes more to GDP in UMICs, this has a positive effect on 
taxation revenue.These results are in line with the argument that Upper-Middle-Income 
countries (UMICs) undertake commercial agriculture, where business transactions are carried 
out formally and are recorded. This therefore makes it easy for taxes to be levied. The results 
show that one percentage point increase in agriculture as a percentage of GDP increases tax 
revenue by 2.39% when our model (4-1) is estimated with a Fixed Effects 2SLS estimator. 
Another important difference from our analysis of pooled country data is that an increase in 
foreign aid translates into a statistically significant increase in taxation revenue. A one 
percentage point increase in total aid leads to a statistically significant increase in tax revenue 
of between 2.65% and 8.87%. Their values are about 2SD of each other, given the high standard 
error for FE-2SLS. 
We further disaggregate foreign aid into loans and grants, as shown in (Table 4-2). The results 
show that tax revenue in UMICs responds differently to concessional loans and grants from 
our study countries in the other income groups. Contrary to earlier findings in the pooled 
analysis, both loans and grants are positive, but mostly not significant. The reason for this might 
be that UMICs do not fall under HIPC initiatives and are therefore not eligible for debt 
forgiveness. For governments of UMICs, the obligation to repay concessional loans is an 
incentive to tax more. We also attribute increased revenue collection to better developed 
institutionsin these countries which have well-developed systems, and more transparent 
governance. 
Other variables respond more or less the same as they do in our pooled analysis, apart from 
trade openness, which is not significant. The GDP per capita turning point for UMICs was 
calculated in the same way it was calculated for all our pooled country sample, and the turning 
point is at $ 7,619.05. 
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Table 4-2: Upper-Middle- Income Countries – Taxation Revenue and Foreign Aid, Grants 
and Loans 
 
Estimation Method FE_ EGLS FE_ EGLS Fixed Effects 2SLS Fixed Effects 2SLS 
C 1.945988***** 2.324999*** 1.223888*** 1.48951*** 
 (0.273485) (0.238596) (0.431983) (0.49255) 
AGR 0.013706 0.006512 0.023871*** 0.012112 
 (0.008551) (0.007521) (0.00889) (1.24E-02) 
GDPP 0.00035*** 0.000286*** 0.000466*** 0.00032*** 
 (4.97E-05) (5.43E-05) (8.23E-05) (8.93E-05) 
GDPP^2 -2.33E-08*** -2.01E-08*** -3.07E-08*** -2.10E-08*** 
 (3.21E-09) (3.61E-09) (5.85E-09) (6.65E-09) 
IND -0.009655*** -1.02E-02*** -7.72E-03** -0.009089*** 
 (0.002375) (1.99E-03) (3.69E-03) (0.003328) 
TRADE 0.000151 -0.000163 0.000978 -0.000632 
 (0.000399) (0.000325) (0.000612) (0.000603) 
TOTALNET 0.026528***  0.088679***  
 (0.007299)  (0.03127)  
GRANTS  0.000223  0.008349 
  (0.000777)  (0.005329) 
LOANSNET  0.00091  0.005323*** 











F-statistic 65.50271 59.13782 70.79569 57.70431 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 
Observations 133 131 128 126 
Cross-Sections 7 7 7 7 
Periods Included 24 24 23 23 
The dependent variable is log (Tax/GDP), all variable are expressed as a percentage of GDP except 
GDP per Capita. Values in parentheses, (), are a standard error. ****, ** and * represent significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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4.2.2 Lower-Middle-Income and Low-Income Economies 
 
The findings for Lower-Middle-Income countries (LMICs) and Low-Income countries (LICs) 
are similar to our analysis of pooled sample (see Table 4-3). This is because LMICs (24% of 
the pooed sample) and LICs (57% of the pooled sample) dominate the pooled sample and the 
analysis’ findings3. For example, a reduction in tax revenue as a result of a one percentage 
point increase in agriculture production in a country’s GDP is similar to the findings with the 
pooled sample, which averaged around 1.1%. 
We further establish the threshold at which an increase in GDP per capita translates to an 
increase in tax revenue at a decreasing rate, by calculating the turning points in LMICs and 
LICs. These are $ 1,161.07 and $ 2,530.41 respectively. 
Our findings from analysing countries by income category are consistent with our argument 
that loans and grants are perceived as free money by recipient governments of LMICs and LICs 
which are members of the HIPC initiative. This is consistent, because UMICs post different 
results. Thus, carrying out an analysis of countries by income group is more revealing than 
analyzing the countries as a pooled sample, which reflect the average effect of the majority of 





























3LMICs stand for Lower-Middle-Income Countries, LICs stand for Low-Income Countries and UMICs stand for 
Upper-Middle Income Countries. 
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Table 4-3: Lower-Middle and Low-Income Economies – Taxation Revenue, Total Aid, 












 Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Low-Income Low-Income 
C 2.822988*** 3.238541*** 2.168584*** 3.364747*** 
 (0.193274) (0.330421) (0.175722) (0.63) 
AGR -0.010913*** -0.013041*** -0.010161*** -0.01106*** 
 (0.002394) (0.003497) (0.001624) (0.002353) 
GDPP 6.95E-05 0.000208* 0.000802* 0.001384** 
 (0.000127) (0.000118) (0.000485) (0.000562) 
GDPP^2 -1.33E-08 -4.11E-08* -2.02E-07 -5.96E-07 
 (2.35E-08) (2.48E-08) (4.18E-07) (4.83E-07) 
IND -0.010448*** -0.00857*** -0.00762*** -0.006133* 
 (0.001704) (0.00221) (0.002248) (0.003476) 
TRADE 0.00198*** 0.001622* 0.005841*** 0.004499*** 
 (0.000614) (0.000902) (0.000633) (0.001135) 
TOTALNET -0.008982  -0.005745***  
 (0.006133)  (0.001902)  
GRANTS  -0.007663**  -0.01593** 
  (0.003346)  (0.006619) 
LOANSNET  -0.003178  -0.014353*** 
  (0.002296)  (0.005136) 
R-squared 0.922982 0.914459 0.788974 0.660398 
F-statistic 151.5073 145.3913 55.31282 59.59915 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 
Observations 207 207 430 428 
Cross-sections 10 10 21 21 
Period 
Included(yr) 
23 23 23 23 
Note: The dependent variable is a log of taxation revenue/GDP; all regressors are measured as a percentage of 
GDP, except GDP per capita. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5 and 10 
percent, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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4.3 Introduction of Tertiary School Enrolment 
 
We introduce our third model, which contains a variable for tertiary school enrolment, as the 
proxy for skills-level of the workforce and specifically as a measure of revenue departments’ 
administrative ability to collect taxes. Tertiary school enrollment is included in the model as a 
determinant of tax revenue because we assume that country’s workforce is correlated with the 
availability of skilled personnel for tax collection duties.That is, a country with more educated 
tax collectors will collect more tax revenue. The estimated model results shown in (Table 4-4) 
agree with our expectations of a positive effect of tertiary school enrolment on tax revenue 
collection. Using a Fixed Effects 2SLS estimator, a percentage point increase in tertiary school 
enrolment leads to a 1.45% increase in tax revenue. The ratio of tertiary school enrolment to 
gross school enrolment was purposely used in the model, as a policy variable to inform 
policymakers about the role of education in DRM. 
During model specification, we intended to introduce tertiary school enrolment as one of the 
control variables in the baseline models. However, variable which meant too few observations 
to make plausible inferences. The control variables in this model, grants and concessional 
loans, behaved more or less the same as in the pooled analysis, which is also a test for 
robustness by adding more variables. 
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Table 4-4: Tax Revenue, Foreign Aid and Tertiary School Enrolment 
 
Estimation Method Fixed EGLS Fixed EGLS Fixed Effects 2SLS Fixed Effects 2SLS 
C 2.492087*** 2.594802*** 2.56E+00** 3.32E+00*** 
 (0.167379) (2.29E-01) (0.180646) (4.64E-01) 
AGR -0.012131*** -1.22E-02*** -1.27E-02*** -0.013069*** 
 (0.003052) (3.15E-03) (0.003299) (3.33E-03) 
GDPP 0.000163* 0.000152* 0.000118 1.05E-04 
 (9.46E-05) (8.21E-05) (0.000112) (1.06E-04) 
GDPP^2 -2.75E-08*** -2.65E-08*** -2.12E-08** -1.91E-08* 
 (9.48E-09) (8.33E-09) (1.04E-08) (1.02E-08) 
IND -0.001176 -0.00141 -0.002248 -0.00373 
 (0.002389) (0.002388) (0.002407) (2.52E-03) 
TRADE 0.001329* 0.001467** 0.001932*** 0.002619*** 
 (0.000748) (0.000687) (0.000684) (0.000799) 
SCH 0.025328*** 0.026043*** 0.023155*** 0.028638*** 
 (0.00592) (0.006978) (0.006452) (0.009461) 
TOTALNET 0.000709  -0.000879  
 (0.001925)  (0.003143)  
GRANTS  -0.001129  -0.009898* 
  (0.001503)  (0.005506) 
LOANSNET  -0.000451  -0.005095 
  (0.000545)  (0.003205) 
R-squared 0.814365 0.812617 0.822236 0.797122 
F-statistic 35.60542 34.20043 35.38436 34.29709 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 
Observations 393 392 373 372 
Cross-Sections 37 37 37 37 
Periods Included 23 23 22 22 
Note: The dependent variable is a log of taxation revenue/GDP. All regressors are measured as a percentage of 
GDP, except GDP per capita. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5 and 
10 percent respectively 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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4.4 Robustness Test 
 
To test for robustness, we can either add or subtract regressors, and monitor how the estimates 
behave in response to these modifications of model specifications. A stable model, which is 
the measure of robustness, will not reflect major changes in estimates regarding signs and 
magnitudes. We choose to add two control variables to the baseline model: Oil rent as a 
percentage of GDP) and tertiary school enrolment (as a percentage of gross school enrolment). 
The choice of oil rent was compelled by the argument in the literature that oil exporters make 
low tax efforts because it is easy for their governments to collect oil related revenue, such as 
royalties and dividends, than taxes (Uche & Uche, 2004). These governments may prefer non- 
tax revenue since it requires less accountability to their citizens. 
Uche & Uche (2004) carry out a study in Nigeria on oil and the politics of revenue allocation. 
They reveal that present-day Nigeria is poorer than it was in the pre-oil era. They attribute this 
to an overemphasis on oil revenue compared to other sources of revenue. Our variable oil rent 
(% of GDP) is therefore expected to lower tax revenue, and the model meets our expectation, 
showing that a one percentage point increase in oil rent (% of GDP) leads to a reduction in tax 
revenue by approximately 1.14% when a Fixed Effects 2SLS model is estimated. 
 
Tertiary school enrolment is used as a proxy for skilled tax collectors who are proficient in data 
collection and analysis to develop efficient and fair tax systems and to broaden their country’s 
tax base. Tertiary school enrolment has a positive impact on tax revenue, as expected. The 
results, presented in (Table 4-5) are similar to those of the baseline models of our pooled 
countries, especially the signs of the estimates. Notably, a variable like agriculture has 
consistent signs, and similar estimate magnitudes in the pooled model and the robustness 
model. Similar observations are made for GDP per capita, amongst other control variables. 
Grants and concessional loans are also consistent in signs, but their magnitude changes slightly 
when instrumental variable models are estimated. On the other hand, Fixed Effects models 
maintain consistency in signs and almost equal magnitudes for the baseline regression 
estimates. Our two additional variables, oil rent (% of GDP) and school enrolment, are 
statistically significant, and their impact on tax revenue is in line with our theoretical 
expectations (see Table 4-5). 
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C 2.594802*** 3.12987*** 3.324386*** 2.727346*** 2.743532*** 
 (0.228649) (0.07784) (0.463626) (0.176684) (0.453862) 
AGR -0.012229*** -0.018513*** -0.013069*** -1.11E-02*** -0.010552*** 
 (0.003151) (0.00076) (0.003331) (1.44E-03) (0.003524) 
GDPP 0.000152* 0.000105*** 0.000105 0.000278*** 0.000177 
 (8.21E-05) (1.58E-05) (0.000106) (2.99E-05) (1.28E-04) 
GDPP^2 -2.65E-08*** -8.31E-09*** -1.91E-08* -2.17E-08*** -2.20E-08** 
 (8.33E-09) (1.51E-09) (1.02E-08) (2.44E-09) (1.02E-08) 
IND -1.41E-03 -1.11E-02*** -0.00373 -0.00385*** 2.01E-03 
 (2.39E-03) (1.42E-03) (0.002522) (0.00139) (2.17E-03) 
TRADE 0.001467** 0.002989*** 0.002619*** 0.002278*** 0.004334*** 
 (0.000687) (0.000271) (0.000799) (0.000411) (9.51E-04) 
GRANTS -0.001129 -0.001632** -0.009898* -0.003562* -6.23E-03 
 (0.001503) (0.000649) (0.005506) (0.001852) (4.61E-03) 
LOANSNET -0.000451 -0.001434*** -0.005095 -.004458*** -0.00377 
 (0.000545) (0.000394) (0.003205) (0.001605) (0.002746) 
SCH 0.026043***  0.028638***  0.022933*** 
 (0.006978)  (0.009461)  (0.008378) 
OIL  -0.014112***  -.011395*** -0.023514*** 
  (0.000853)  (0.002018) (0.005461) 
R-squared 0.812617 0.730967 0.797122 0.943539 0.824232 
F-statistic 34.20043 272.0408 34.29709 289.3852 36.63919 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 0 
Observations 392 810 372 779 367 
Cross-Sections 37 40 37 40 37 
Periods 
Included 
23 24 22 23 22 
Note: The dependent variable is log (Tax/GDP), all variable are expressed as a percentage of GDP, 
except GDP per Capita. Values in parentheses, (), are standard errors. ****, ** and * represent 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 





The panel used in this study is an unbalanced panel because of missing data. As a result, our 
analysis software, Eviews, limits us when carrying out diagnostic tests. During estimations, 
we use various methods, as to counter major econometric problems such as heterogeneity, 
endogeneity, and heteroscedasticity to ensure our estimates are unbiased. 
Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that the baseline models in (Table 4-1) are suffering from 
autocorrelation. To correct the autocorrelation problem, and also capture tax revenue’s 
dynamic effects, the models in (Table 4-6) are estimated by using a one period lag of tax 
revenue (dependent variable) as one of the explanatory variables. Durbin-Watson statistics in 
the models reported in (Table 4-6) are very close to 2, which is a rule of thumb for zero 
autocorrelation models. For example, columns (1) and (3) have Durbin-Watson statistics of 
1.930015 and 1.935594, respectively, while columns (2) and (4) have statistics of 1.969344 
and 1.970926 respectively. They are close to 2 and we can therefore, argue that these models 
have zero autocorrelation. Comparing (Table 4-1) and (Table 4-6), it is clear that standard 
errors are slightly larger in (Table 4-1) than in (Table 4-6) as expected, but this does not 
increase the number of statistically significant variables. This implies that the dynamic model 
estimates robust standard errors which are efficient. 
Since serial correlation affects the standard errors only, estimates are less affected (especially 
the signs), and thus interpretation is similar to the estimates in (Table 4-1). However, adding a 
lagged dependent variable on the right hand side means that we must adjust the estimate’s 
coefficients  on  the  independent  variables  by 1⁄1 − 0.73 to  capture  their  long  run effect, 
whereby 0.73 is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (LnTax(-1)). 
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Table 4-6: Tax Revenue and Foreign Aid: Correction for Autocorrelation (Using lag of 
dependent variable) 
 




Fixed Effects 2SLS 
(3) 
Fixed Effects 2SLS 
(4) 
C 0.677554*** 0.656134*** 0.634979*** 0.691942*** 
 (0.099068) (0.100568) (0.114426) (0.163478) 
LNTAX(-1) 0.720822*** 0.739973*** 0.731438*** 0.73301*** 
 (0.027031) (0.025931) (0.026787) (0.026568) 
AGR -0.002661** -0.002852** -0.002578** -0.002534** 
 (0.001221) (0.001271) (1.26E-03) (0.00126) 
GDPP 4.19E-05** 5.95E-05*** 4.91E-05** 6.52E-05*** 
 (1.80E-05) (1.74E-05) (2.18E-05) (1.63E-05) 
GDPP^2 -3.22E-09** -4.67E-09*** -3.79E-09** -5.04E-09*** 
 (1.28E-09) (1.29E-09) (1.51E-09) (1.15E-09) 
IND -0.000294 -0.000383 -0.000403 -0.000431 
 (0.000645) (0.000647) (0.000713) (0.000642) 
TRADE 0.000886*** 0.000986*** 0.000855*** 0.000932*** 
 (0.000219) (0.000226) (0.000207) (0.000224) 
TOTALNET -0.002016*  -0.000818  
 (0.001159)  (0.001531)  
GRANTS  -0.000797**  -0.001055 
  (0.000253)  (0.001519) 
LOANSNET  -0.000319*  -0.00136 
  (0.000165)  (0.001439) 
R-squared 0.964563 0.967403 0.965097 0.966925 
F-statistic 440.2354 467.8994 445.24 475.7556 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 
Durbin-Watson 1.930015 1.969344 1.935594 1.970926 
Observations 791 789 790 786 
Cross-Sections 40 40 40 40 
Periods Included 23 23 23 23 
The dependent variable is log (Tax/GDP). All variable are expressed as a percentage of GDP, except 
GDP per Capita. Values in parentheses, (), are standard errors. ****, ** and * represent significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%. 




5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
Our underlying hypothesis for our study is that recipient governments treat loans differently 
from grants. Loans have a positive impact on tax revenue, because of the obligation to pay, 
which acts as an incentive to collect more tax.Grants, however, are treated as a source of free 
resources, and this creates a disincentive to tax. This should be an incentive for policymakers 
to channel borrowed funds (loans) to productive projects that ultimately increase taxes and 
facilitate repayment. 
We start our analysis with a basic model of our study countries as a pooled sample, and then 
carry out a similar analysis for countries grouped according to World Bank income categories 
(Upper-Middle-Income, Lower-Middle-Income, and Low- Income) , to account for structural 
differences. 
Strategy for Discussion: 
 
1) Basic Model (Analysis of pooled country sample) 
2) Analysis of countries by  Income Category 
3) Addition of Tertiary schooling variable 
 
In the basic model, there is a positive relationship between tax revenue and GDP per capita, as 
expected, because tax revenues increase with rising incomes. We also find that the relationship 
is nonlinear by including GDP per capita squared, which was significant with a negative sign. 
To determine the threshold at which an increase in income level affects tax revenue at a 
decreasing rate, we calculate turning for the pooled sample and for each income group.. UMICs 
have a turning point of $ 7,619.05, LMICs of $ 2,530.41, LICs of $ 1,161.07, and our pooled 
country sample of $ 6,186.05. 
We also control for the structure of the economy, by including terms for agriculture as a share 
of GDP and industry as a share of GDP. We find an increase in agriculture as a share of GDP 
has a negative effect on tax revenue. This is expected because much agricultural production is 
informal or on subsistence agriculture, which makes it difficult to levy tax in this sector. 
However, industry similarly showed a negative impact on the tax revenue. We consider this is 
due to the large number of countries in our sample that provide prolonged tax holidays to 
industrial companies, especially multinationals, which practise transfer pricing. 
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Trade openness posts a positive effect on tax revenue in the basic model, which showed that 
more trade led to a higher tax/GDP share. This captures the fact that some taxes are trade- 
related (e.g. tariffs, excises, etc.) but would also indicate that more foreign trade leads to greater 
prosperity and a higher tax/GDP share. 
 
 
Grants and loans both have a negative sign, indicating that governments, overall, find them to 
be a disincentive to tax, or they are used as a substitute for tax revenue collection. It appears 
that policymakers in HIPC countries expect to receive debt relief/forgiveness on their loans, 
and thus don’t take the obligation to repay seriously. 
In contrast, agriculture had a positive effect on tax revenue in UMICs. This can be explained 
by the fact thatthese countries have attained significant levels of economic and institutional 
development, which translates into more formal businesses and, commercial agriculture, both 
of which are easier to tax. 
Results for industry as a percent of GDP were not as expected. Levying taxes in formal sectors 
of the economy should be easier, because these sectors have formal transaction records. The 
negative impact of an increase in industry input to GDP on tax revenue might be explained by 
the high share of multinationals in the industrial sector, which practise transfer pricing. UMICs 
might also be affected by prolonged tax holidays for investors. 
We examine our variables of interest in countries grouped by income category. This analysis 
shows foreign aid, loans, and grants have a negative impact on tax revenue. This is more less 
the same as the findings under pooled analysis, implying that the composition of foreign aid 
does not matter. UMICs posted different results, where foreign aid, loans, and grants total had 
a positive effect on tax revenue. 
Most of the LMICs and LICs in our sample receive debt relief under the HIPC initiative. We 
argue that recipient governments formulate an expectation of always receiving debt forgiveness 
and therefore treat both loans and grants as a free source of funds, and a substitute for taxation 
revenue. This creates a disincentive to tax citizens, who demand accountability for their taxes. 
However, UMICs in our sample respond differently and both loans and grants demonstrate a 
positive effect on tax revenue. The positive effect of loans is a result of UMICs being ineligible 
for debt relief, and their governments are obligated to repay their loans, which creates an 
incentive to collect more taxes. The positive relationship between grants and tax revenue is 
explained by the fact that UMICs have achieved a significant level of development which 
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translates into increased levels of efficiency and accountability in revenue systems from 
additional resources added to the fiscal. 
 
Lastly, we undertake a robustness check by introducing a variable for tertiary school enrolment 
as a proxy for the skills level of the workforce in tax administration. We also introduce a 
variable for oil rent as a percentage of GDP, to test the resource curse effect. We find that 
higher education levels (representing more skilled tax administrators) were significantly 
associated with a higher rate of tax collection, and increases in oil rents reduced the tax share. 
After introducing these new variables, the coefficients on the other variables appeared to 
remain roughly stable, indicating a reasonable amount of robustness in the model. 
 
One clear policy implication of this study is that donors could channel their grants and loans 
directly to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or the private sector, rather than to the 
governments of LMICs and LICs, thus reducing any disincentive that these governments might 
have to forgo taxation. 
We recommend further research to investigate the impact of industry as a share of GDP on tax 
revenue collection. We further recommend research to evaluate the most effective foreign aid 
transmission mechanism through NGOs and to what extent this would impact on tax revenue 
collection. 
One of the limitations of this study arose during diagnostic tests on heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and cross-section dependency. We employ estimation methods to correct 
heteroscedasticity and heterogeneity. For autocorrelation, we estimate our baseline regression 
of our pooled country sample by the use of a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side. 
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Appendix A World Bank Classification of Countries by income level (July 2015) 
 
 










Benin Cameroon Angola Angola 

















Chad Ghana Mauritius Equatorial Guinea 
Comoros Kenya Namibia Gabon 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Nigeria Seychelles Nigeria 
Eritrea Senegal South Africa Sudan 
Ethiopia Sudan   
Gambia, The Zambia   
Guinea    
Guinea-Bissau    
Liberia    
Madagascar    
Malawi    
Mali    
Mozambique    
Niger    
Rwanda    
Sierra Leone    
Tanzania    
Togo    
Uganda    
Zimbabwe    
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Appendix B Descriptive Statistics 
 
 








    




12.25904 11.22402 38.26640 0.600195 6.154496 827 
AGR Agriculture/GDP 28.43661 29.38456 62.38273 2.032283 15.02896 827 
IND Industry/GDP 24.66205 21.28279 77.41366 6.791070 12.39448 827 
GDPP GDP per Capita 1627.903 687.6126 11124.66 160.3213 2271.789 827 
TRADE Trade/GDP 66.32686 58.62814 225.0231 11.08746 30.56700 827 
GRANTS Grants/GDP 76.24851 77.06210 100.0000 14.37607 14.72454 827 

















All variables are as a percentage of GDP, except for GDP per Capita 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Appendix C     Explanation of Test 
 
a) Unit Root Test 
 
This is critical to carrying out any form of empirical analysis. For instance, two non-stationary 
variables trending together over time may post a very high 𝑅2 despite the two being unrelated. 
Carrying out regression with non-stationary variables may violate standard assumptions and 
eventually produce spurious results and wrong inferences. To test for unit root, we use 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests, where the null hypothesis is 
the presence of unit root, or rather a series which has characteristics of a random walk, and the 
alternative hypothesis is absence of unit root/stationary. Most of our non-stationary variables 
are converted to stationary variables by first differencing. If a non-stationary variable is 
converted to stationary variable by first differencing, it is said to be integrated of order one,  I 
(1) and integrated of second order, if it is differenced twice, I (2). 
 
Unit root exists in two forms, deterministic and stochastic process. The deterministic process 
is mean reverting, meaning that the deviation from the mean value is temporary. The stochastic 
process results in permanent deviations from the mean, leading to long run effects on the 
variable. Variables which possess stochastic processes can be stationary through differencing 
and variables with the deterministic process are detrended by being regressed on time to 
remove the time effects. 
Let us consider a random walk model without drift; 
 
𝑌𝑡    = 𝜌𝑌𝑡−1  + 𝜇𝑡 
Where 𝑌𝑡 represents the time series variable and 𝜇𝑡 the error term. In the event𝜌 = 1, the 
variable is non-stationary, and when absolute values of 𝜌 ≤1, the series is stationary and the 
error term,𝜇𝑡, is white noise. Non-stationary variables are first differenced by subtracting the 
previous term from the current term i.e. 𝑌𝑡    − 𝑌𝑡−1. 
This test seeks to establish whether the dependent variable, tax, is stationary or non- stationary. 
All test methods show that the series is non-stationary at level but becomes stationary after first 
difference, implying that tax is I(1). We further investigate our key variables, grants and net 
loans, and are also found to be non-stationary at level, but stationary on first difference. This 
means that tax, grants and net loans are cointegrated of the same order. Since the subject 
variables  are cointegrated  of the same  order,  I(1), and  are all  non-stationary,  which  is    a 
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precondition for the cointegration test, we can run a Johansen cointegration test to establish 
their long-run relationship. 
Table C-1: Unit Root Tests 
 
Variable ADF-Fisher Test Phillips-Perron Fisher Test  
 
Level First Difference Level First Difference Order of Integration 
Tax -3.4787***  -3.7126***  I (0) 
LnTax -4.0944***  -5.0802***  I (0) 
Agriculture -3.1597***  -3.4752***  I (0) 
Industry -1.8615***  -1.9726***  I (0) 
GDP per Capita 1.56865 -13.9464*** 1.2471 -17.7749*** I (1) 
Trade -3.7888***  -3.7011***  I (0) 
Exports -3.9865***  -4.7134***  I (0) 
Imports -3.7845***  -4.6864***  I (0) 
Total Aid -6.3889***  -6.5997***  I (0) 
Grants -8.7030***  -8.6327***  I (0) 
Net Loans -9.48191***  -9.02385***  I (0) 
Oil -02.18*** -11.1848*** 0.35572 -15.1666*** I (1) 
School 6.01E+0 -3.7863*** 6.00998 -4.36962*** I (1) 
Note: *** represent rejection of null hypothesis at 1% level of significance. ADF & PP Choi Z- statistics are 
used and all test equations include individual intercept and trend. The null hypothesis is the presence of unit root 




b) Long Run Relationship/Fisher-Johansen Cointegration Test 
 
If any linear combination of two or more series are integrated of order zero, I (0), we 
conclude that the series are cointegrated (Engle and Granger, 1987). A Johansen 
Cointegration test can only take place if the series involved are integrated of the same order. 
Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988) are the two commonly used methods to carry 
out cointegration tests. Deviations from the equilibrium of cointegrated variables will 
eventually return to the equilibrium point, meaning that the shock is not permanent or rather 
does not cause permanent deviations. These deviations from the equilibrium path can be 
modeled by an Error Correction Model. 
 
This test seek to establish the long-run relationship among tax, agriculture, industry, GDP per 
capita, trade, grants and net loans. Pedroni’s Residual Cointegration Test carry’s out the   test 
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by formulating a null hypothesis of no cointegration and an alternative hypothesis of the 
presence of cointegration. In our analysis, most of the methods show that our variables are not 
cointegrated-which implies they do not have a long-run relationship. 
We perform the same test to establish the long-run relationship between tax and our variables 
of interest, grants and net loans. The same conclusion is reached, where most methods show 
no cointegration among these variables (Table C-2) 
 
 
Table C-2: Cointegration Test 
 
Series: LNTAX AGR GDPP IND TRADE GRANTS LOANSNET 
Hypothesized Fisher Stat.*  Fisher Stat.*  
No. of CE(s) (from trace test) Prob. (from max-eigen test) Prob. 
None 1097. 0.0000 1677. 0.0000 
At most 1 1126. 0.0000 657.9 0.0000 
At most 2 754.2 0.0000 464.6 0.0000 
At most 3 433.4 0.0000 261.4 0.0000 
At most 4 227.9 0.0000 143.7 0.0000 
At most 5 140.6 0.0000 103.3 0.0002 
At most 6 132.1 0.0000 132.1 0.0000 
 
c) ARDL Model or Bound Test 
 
 
According to the empirical studies, (Pesaran, Shin, & Smith, 2001, Pesaran & Shin, 1999), 
carrying out regression with variables integrated on different orders might produce biased 
estimates. In our case, since the non-stationary variables are cointegrated, we can carry out 
regression without reproducing spurious results. To test for cointegration with variables 
integrated of different order calls for a more advanced model, like ARDL, which has been 
tested to allow analysis of variables with different orders of integration. The ARDL model in 
equation (C-1), includes lags of both regressand and regressors as explanatory variables 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛼0𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑞𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑞 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (C-1) 
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ARDL Model Results 
 
The short run relationship is represented by the differenced variables and a test for a long run 




Table C-3: ARDL Model Results 
 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTAX) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.436186 0.107878 4.043326 0.0001 
D(LNTAX(-1)) -0.007523 0.034411 -0.218629 0.8270 
D(LNTAX(-2)) -0.051159 0.034547 -1.480864 0.1391 
D(AGR(-1)) 0.002104 0.001245 1.690215 0.0915 
D(AGR(-2)) 0.000962 0.000986 0.976072 0.3294 
D(GDPP(-1)) 8.61E-06 2.95E-05 0.291383 0.7709 
D(GDPP(-2)) -3.39E-05 2.90E-05 -1.168595 0.2430 
D(IND(-1)) 0.001898 0.001272 1.492561 0.1360 
D(IND(-2)) 0.001747 0.001088 1.605453 0.1089 
D(TRADE(-1)) -4.22E-05 0.000405 -0.104208 0.9170 
D(TRADE(-2)) 0.000218 0.000230 0.949488 0.3427 
D(GRANTS(-1)) -0.001481 0.000602 -2.458519 0.0142 
D(GRANTS(-2)) -0.000279 0.000465 -0.598658 0.5496 
D(LOANSNET(-1)) -0.000358 0.000332 -1.077211 0.2818 
D(LOANSNET(-2)) -5.52E-05 0.000241 -0.228846 0.8191 
LNTAX(-1) -0.218775 0.026961 -8.114415 0.0000 
AGR(-1) -0.000223 0.001170 -0.190718 0.8488 
GDPP(-1) 2.11E-05 7.54E-06 2.797919 0.0053 
IND(-1) 0.000842 0.001041 0.808378 0.4192 
TRADE(-1) 0.000308 0.000256 1.202056 0.2298 
GRANTS(-1) 0.000481 0.000715 0.673114 0.5011 
LOANSNET(-1) -0.000232 0.000345 -0.671721 0.5020 
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Table C-4: Wald Test Diagnostic  
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F-statistic 12.04315 (7, 636) 0.0000 




Null Hypothesis: C(16)=C(17)=C(18)=C(19)=C(20)=C(21)= 
C(22)=0 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
C(16) -0.218775 0.026961 
C(17) -0.000223 0.001170 
C(18) 2.11E-05 7.54E-06 
C(19) 0.000842 0.001041 
C(20) 0.000308 0.000256 
C(21) 0.000481 0.000715 
C(22) -0.000232 0.000345 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.   
 
 
To reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis, we need to compare the F-statistic with the Pesaran 
critical value at 5 percent level. Since we are using unrestricted intercept with no trend model, 
the Pesaran table gives 3.79 as the lower bound and the upper bound value is 4.85. The 
guidelines state that when the F-Statistic is greater than the upper bound, we can reject the null 
hypothesis. In our case, the F-Statistic is 12.04 which is greater than 4.85, the Pesaran upper 
bound. This means that we can reject the null hypothesis and choose the alternative. By 
rejecting the null hypothesis, we are simply saying that, 
C(15)=C(16)=C(17)=C(18)=C(19)=C(20)=C(21)≠0, jointly. These are the coefficients of log 
(Tax), Agriculture. GDP per capita, Industry, Trade, Grants and Net loans respectively, which 
the test argues have long run relationship/association. 
We estimate our long-run model and derive the residual to establish the speed adjustment 
towards long-run equilibrium, since the coefficients of the differenced variables represent the 
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short run relationship. (Table C-5) shows that the error correction term (ECT (-1)) is negative 
and statistically significant, which meets the guidelines for determining a system’s speed of 




Table C-5: Dependent Variable 
 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTAX) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.012982 0.005558 2.335878 0.0198 
D(LNTAX(-1)) 0.633147 0.205006 3.088427 0.0021 
D(LNTAX(-2)) -0.141725 0.038081 -3.721693 0.0002 
D(AGR(-1)) 0.001669 0.001031 1.618971 0.1060 
D(AGR(-2)) -0.000343 0.001240 -0.276775 0.7820 
D(GDPP(-1)) -1.18E-05 3.36E-05 -0.352469 0.7246 
D(GDPP(-2)) -1.30E-05 3.06E-05 -0.424275 0.6715 
D(IND(-1)) 0.002030 0.001175 1.726937 0.0847 
D(IND(-2)) -0.000419 0.001370 -0.306158 0.7596 
D(TRADE(-1)) 0.000281 0.000442 0.635317 0.5255 
D(TRADE(-2)) 0.000358 0.000194 1.842905 0.0658 
D(GRANTS(-1)) -0.000852 0.000469 -1.818071 0.0696 
D(GRANTS(-2)) 0.001053 0.000564 1.869029 0.0621 
D(LOANSNET(-1)) -0.000481 0.000208 -2.318001 0.0208 
D(LOANSNET(-2)) 0.000329 0.000247 1.336456 0.1819 
ECT(-1) -0.804886 0.211017 -3.814318 0.0002 
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Short Run Causality 
 
Key variables in this study are grants and concessional loans. We are interested in establishing 
their short run causality, as much as we are interested in their long run causality. We use the 
Wald test to diagnose coefficients of grants and net loans, with lagged two periods, these are 
C (12), C (13), C (14), and C (15) respectively, as shown in (Table C-6). According to the 
tabulated results, we reject the null hypothesis at 1% significance level. We therefore conclude 
that grants and concessional loans jointly have short run causality on tax revenue (running from 
grants and loans to taxation revenue). The same test was carried out on other independent 
variables, and the results (not tabulated) show that there is short run causality running from the 
independent variables jointly to tax revenue. 
Table C-6: Short Run Causality Wald Test 
 
 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F-statistic 4.558131 (4, 600) 0.0012 
Chi-square 18.23252 4 0.0011 
Null Hypothesis: C(12)=C(13)=C(14)=C(15)=0 
Null Hypothesis Summary:    
Normalized Restriction (= 0)  Value Std. Err. 
C(12)  -0.000852 0.000469 
C(13)  0.001053 0.000564 
C(14)  -0.000481 0.000208 
C(15)  0.000329 0.000247 
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d) Hausman Test 
 
The Hausman test determines whether a Fixed Effects or Random Effects model is more 
appropriate for our estimation. Fixed Effects assume country heterogeneity, and Random 
effects assume country homogeneity. The null hypothesis in this test is that a Random Effects 
model is appropriate, and the alternative hypothesis is that a Fixed Effects model is appropriate. 
According to the results presented in (Table C-7), the p-value is statistically significant. We 
reject the null hypothesis and use Fixed Effects model in our estimations. 
 
Table C-7: Fixed Effects vs Random Effects Model 
 
 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 27.132921 7 0.0003 
 
 










C 2.611353*** 3.122385*** 2.891052*** 3.580997*** 
 (0.085667) (0.169622) (0.173745) (0.339498) 
AGR -0.012544*** -0.021623*** -0.0117242*** -0.022612*** 
 (0.00117) (0.002514) (0.001341) (2.68E-03) 
GDPP 2.73E-04*** 1.88E-04*** 0.000266*** 1.56E-04*** 
 (2.76E-05) (4.17E-05) (2.93E-05) (4.46E-05) 
GDPP^2 -2.13E-08*** -1.79E-08*** -2.15E-08*** -1.48E-08*** 
 (2.23E-09) (3.46E-09) (2.36E-09) (3.84E-09) 
IND -0.007125*** -0.0111*** -0.007006*** -1.22E-02*** 
 (0.001258) (0.001784) (0.001313) (1.91E-03) 
TRADE 0.001817*** 0.002359*** 0.001904*** 0.002481*** 
 (0.000356) (0.000629) (0.000385) (0.000705) 
GRANTS -0.001253** -0.002222* -0.004682*** -0.006715* 
 (0.000594) (0.001298) (0.001845) (0.003766) 
LOANSNET -0.000716** -0.001442** -0.004713*** -0.005757** 
 (0.000346) (0.000655) (0.001585) (0.002541) 
R-squared 0.947059 0.216377 0.942383 0.180651 
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F-statistic 303.3358 32.30657 293.9313 32.52465 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 
Observations 827 827 794 794 
Cross-Sections 40 40 40 40 
Periods Included 24 24 23 23 
Note: The dependent variable is log of taxation revenue/GDP. All regressors are measured as a percentage of GDP, 
except GDP per capita. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5 and 10 percent 
respectively. Estimation is Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) using country Fixed Effects 
 
In (Table 4-1) we use Fixed Effects and Fixed Effects 2SLS to estimate the two models, and 
in (Table C-8), we estimate the model by comparing Fixed Effects and Random Effects with 
Fixed Effects 2SLS and Random 2SLS estimators. To decide on the appropriate model, we 
carry out the Hausman Test. The null hypothesis prefers a Random Effects over Fixed Effects 
estimator. In our test, we reject the null hypothesis at 1% and choose the Fixed Effects 
estimator as the appropriate estimator. This is supported in the literature which states that 
unobserved country heterogeneity explains the difference in tax revenue across counties. 
(Table C-8) further supports our test by depicting higher R-squared in Fixed Effects estimator 
than in Random Effects, i.e., 0.942383 and 0.180651 
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Appendix D     Explanation of Estimation Methods 
 
Fixed Effects 
The error term in equation (3-1) contains the unobservable country heterogeneity, and the 
stochastic disturbance term which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
with a mean of zero and constant variance(0, 𝛿2). 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (D-1) 
Where 𝛼𝑖 denotes the unobservable country-specific effect and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 denotes the stochastic 
disturbance term. 
To further explain how the fixed effect works, we will consider the model below, where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
represents all the explanatory variables of our model in equation (3-1) 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (D-2) 
Where 𝑖 = 1 … . 𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1 … . 𝑇 which are country and time indicators respectively. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a 
time-varying 1 × 𝐾 regressors matrix which comprises both exogenous and endogenous 
variables in the model. 
Substituting equation (D-1) into equation (D-2) yields the following one-way error component 
model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖  + +𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (D-3) 
To estimate our model, we employ within transformation, where the unobservable country- 
specific effects are wiped out after transformation of the model, to use a Fixed Effect estimator 
which assumes strict exogeneity. 
Considering a hypothetical model in equation (D-6), we average over time and obtain: 
 
?̅?𝑖  = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖  + +?̅?𝑖𝛽 + ?̅?𝑖 (D-4) 
Where ?̅?𝑖  = ∑𝑇   1 𝑦𝑖𝑡⁄𝑇 𝑡= 
 
The transformed model is obtained by subtracting equation (D-4) from equation (D-3) which 
gives: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  − ?̅?𝑖  = 𝛽(𝑥𝑖𝑡  − ?̅?𝑖) + (𝜇𝑖𝑡  − ?̅?𝑖) (D-5) 
Let 𝑦?̈? =𝑦𝑖  − ?̅?𝑖, 𝑥?̈? =𝑥𝑖𝑡  − ?̅?𝑖  and 𝜇𝑖̈ =𝜇𝑖𝑡  − ?̅?𝑖  such that averaging our model across countries, we 
end up with the following model: 
?̈?  = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥̈  + 𝜇̈ 
By restricting ∑𝑁  1 𝛼𝑖  = 0 𝑖= 
(D-6) 
Moreover, equation (D-5) and (D-6) end up without the country-specific effect,𝑖, proving the 
argument  that  transforming  the  data  wipes  out  the  effect.  In  our  study,  we  estimate   a 
62  
. 
multivariate model specified in equation (3-1) but transformed in the same way as the 
hypothetical model explained above, by simply time-demeaning each explanatory variable. 
 
Fixed Effects 2sls Estimator 
 
This section explains how instrument variables work, where 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is, 1 × 𝐿, defines time-varying 
instrument variables which also contain all the exogenous variables in 𝑥𝑖𝑡 which is 1 × 𝐾 for 
all 𝑡. For identification conditions, 𝐿 ≥ 𝐾. 
The matrix of explanatory variables 𝑋  defined over 𝑇 × 𝐾 is given as: 
𝑥𝑖1 
𝑋  = (𝑥𝑖2.  ) and matrix of instrument variables 𝑍  = ( 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 
𝑧𝑖1 ⋯ 0 
⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ) 
0 ⋯ 𝑧𝑖𝑡 
Using a Fixed Effects Instrument Variable estimator, the coefficient is estimated as shown 
below: 
𝑁 𝑁 −1 𝑁 −1 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 
?̂?  = [(∑ ?̀?𝑖 𝑍𝑖) (∑ ?̀?𝑖 𝑍𝑖) (∑ ?̀?𝑖 𝑋𝑖)] × (∑ ?̀?𝑖 𝑍𝑖) (∑ ?̀?𝑖 𝑍𝑖) (∑ ?̀?𝑖 𝑦𝑖) 
𝑖=1 𝑖=1 𝑖=1 𝑖=1 𝑖=1 𝑖=1 
The coefficient can also be estimated using Fixed Effects 2SLS by running auxiliary 
regression−, i.e., running reduced form regressions of 𝑋𝑖𝑡   on 𝑍𝑖𝑡   to obtain fitted values of 
𝑋𝑖𝑡, ?̂?𝑖𝑡, which is termed as the first-stage, and using fitted values,?̂?𝑖𝑡  in place of 𝑋𝑖𝑡  to estimate 
the values of beta, which is second-stage, therefore combining first-stage and the second- stage 
(2SLS chooses the fitted values which is highly related with the endogenous variable), 
estimation of the 𝛽 is given as; 
𝑁 𝑇 −1 𝑁 𝑇 












Appendix E Diagnostic Test 
 
a) Testing Joint Validity Of Fixed Effects 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests 
Test cross-section Fixed Effects 
Effects Test Statistic d.f. 
Cross-section F 71.58088*** (39,781) 
 
















































   
Series: Standardized Residuals 
























Std. Dev. 0.234790 
Skewness -0.476126 
Kurtosis 3.257258 
Jarque-Bera 33.52682 
Probability 0.000000 
 
